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Introduction  
In his Nobel Lecture Akerlof, emphasizing the increasing role that behavioral principles play within 
contemporary macroeconomics, argues that “in the spirit of Keynes’ General Theory” behavioral 
macroeconomists are substituting the ‘primitive’ New Classical micro-foundations of macroeconomics with 
more realistic behavioral assumptions “grounded in psychological and sociological observation” (Akerlof 2002, 
p. 413).  
Starting from the above statement our paper aims to show (i) that behavioral rather than maximizing principles 
emerge as the micro-foundations for Keynes’s Consumption Theory; and (ii) that it is possible, theoretically 
legitimate and empirically robust to ground a Keynesian-type aggregate consumption function on (some of) the 
principles underlying contemporary behavioral models.  
To pursue the first goal we adopt a history-of-ideas perspective. We perform textual analysis of the General 
Theory and its preparatory works to ascertain, with particular reference to consumption behavior, to what extent 
Keynes assumes maximizing agents and to what extent he refers, rather, to alternative psychological motivations 
for individuals’ decisions, in a spirit closer to contemporary behavioral models. We argue that, although Keynes 
never explicitly refuses the maximizing principle, this principle plays virtually no role in the General Theory; on 
the contrary, he often attaches a crucial role to alternative behavioral principles. For the particular case of 
consumption, Keynes grounds consumers’ decisions almost exclusively on these alternative behavioral 
principles.  
To pursue the second goal we adopt a theoretical perspective. We investigate contemporary behavioral 
economics approaches in search for empirically robust foundations for the Keynesian consumption function 
(both in Keynes’s original and in later IS-LM version). In doing so we conclude that the main psychological 
principles which, in addition to the standard maximizing principle, influence individuals’ consumption decisions 
(and which are quite similar to some of the psychological motivations for individuals’ behavior adopted by 
Keynes) are preference for procrastination, shortsightedness (or myopia) and miscalculation, mental budgeting 
and debt aversion; whereas the behavioral economics theoretical approaches that have been applied in the study 
of these principles are mainly hyperbolic discounting and mental accounting. We also show that adopting 
neoclassical foundations (maximizing agents and exponential discounting) we get results coherent with the 
standard life-cycle and permanent-income models, but which are at odds with the empirical evidence. On the 
other hand, by adopting these alternative behavioral foundations we get results coherent both with the empirical 
evidence and with Keynesian Consumption theory. In particular, we show that both the psychological principles 
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which characterize consumers’ behavior and the method that can be used for building the aggregate 
consumption function are common to Keynes and contemporary behavioral approach. As a consequence our 
behaviorally based consumption function is similar – although not identical in its formal specification – to the 
Keynesian one. 
The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 1 discusses the role of the maximizing principle in Keynes’s approach and investigates the presence of 
behaviorally-inspired determinants for individuals’ decisions in Keynes’s consumption theory. Section 2 
discusses whether an empirically robust aggregate consumption function can be obtained on the basis of the life-
cycle and permanent-income hypotheses, i.e. within the traditional (maximizing) approach. Section 3 explores 
the possibility of building an empirically robust aggregate consumption function of Keynesian flavor on the 
basis of behavioral assumptions, hence outside the traditional (maximizing) approach. Section 4 sums up the 
main results and draws the conclusions.  
1. Maximizing and Behavioral Principles in Keynes’s Consumption 
Theory 
1.1 The maximizing principle in Keynes’s analysis  
Textual analysis of the entire General Theory comes up with very few references to maximizing procedures and 
these references are also somewhat ambiguous. One is contained in Chapter 6 of the book, in which Keynes 
gives his definitions of income, saving and investment: “[T]he entrepreneur’s income [...] is taken as being equal 
to the quantity, depending on his scale of production, which he endeavors to maximize, i.e. to his gross profit in 
the ordinary sense of this term; - which agrees with common sense. […] Since it is the entrepreneur’s 
expectation of the excess of this quantity over his outgoings to the other factors of production which he 
endeavors to maximize when he decides how much employment to give to the other factors of production, it is 
the quantity which is causally significant for employment.”  (Keynes 1973a, pp. 53-4; see also p. 56 and pp. 24-
5). 
Another passage is contained in the preparatory work of the General Theory, in one of the drafts of Chapter 3
1 
and represents the most explicit reference to the marginal cost=marginal revenue rule: “[E]ach firm calculates 
the prospective selling price of its output and its variable costs in respect of output on various possible scales of 
production. […] Output is then pushed to the point at which the prospective selling price no longer exceeds the 
marginal variable cost” (Keynes 1979, p. 98; see also p. 89). However, even though there is no textual evidence 
anywhere in the General Theory of an explicit rejection of profit maximization by Keynes, this passage, perhaps 
significantly, was not included in the final version.
2  
A clearer reference to marginal analysis is contained in Keynes’s treatment of the labour market (Chapter 2 of 
the General Theory), and in particular in his acceptance of the first postulate of the neoclassical theory of 
employment (the equality between wage and marginal productivity of labour) and of the inverse relation 
between real wages and the level of employment (Keynes 1973a, pp. 17-18). This result – as Keynes himself 
admits - is a consequence of the assumption of decreasing marginal productivity of labour for increasing level of 
employment and production, which is fully in accordance with the traditional theory and implies maximizing 
procedures by entrepreneurs. However, Keynes himself introduces many other elements of realism in the 
analysis to explain the level of the aggregate employment in the system and workers’ behavior. First of all, the 
consideration of the institutional character of the labour market: the workers, organised in trade unions, 
negotiate the monetary and not real wages, whose level they are not able to control directly;
3 secondly, they are 
much more sensitive to changes in monetary than in real wages; thirdly, they tend to resist decreasing wage 
levels and in so doing, they contribute to the stability of the economic system. In Keynes’s words: “[T]hus it is 
fortunate that the workers, though unconsciously, are instinctively more reasonable economists than the classical 
school, inasmuch as they resist reductions of money wages […] (Keynes 1973a, p. 14) 
The non-stabilizing role of wage-flexibility for the whole economy is fully examined by Keynes in Chapter 19, 
where the conclusion is reached that a decrease in monetary/real wages is not able to guarantee the result of full 
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2 For an analysis of the role of profit maximization in Keynes’s General Theory see Marcuzzo and 
Sanfilippo (2007, pp. 76-78). 
3 “There may exist no expedient by which labour as a whole can reduce its real wage to a given figure by 
making revised money bargains with entrepreneurs” (Keynes 1973a, p.13). 
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employment and, on the contrary, can negatively affect the level of aggregate demand and employment via its 
influence on the propensity to consume, the rate of interest and the preference for liquidity (Keynes 1973a, pp. 
260-68). One of the main arguments suggested by Keynes is of an institutionalist type, based on the 
deterioration of the industrial relations and widespread sense of uncertainty brought about by a reduction in 
wages. Therefore, the partial acceptance of marginal analysis in the labour market does not imply optimal results 
in terms of employment for the system as a whole.  
In the end, it appears evident that when Keynes “adopts” the marginal language, he employs it quite sparingly, 
as if it were extraneous to the core of his model. Reliance on marginal analysis and maximizing behaviour is, in 
fact, very limited in the General Theory, whose main message lies in its being other than the “classical” theory. 
Keynes’s criticism of the latter consists “in pointing out that its tacit assumptions are seldom or never satisfied, with 
the result that it cannot solve the economic problems of the actual world” (Keynes 1973a, p. 378). 
1.2 Behavioral principles in Keynes’s consumption theory 
Turning, now, to Keynes’s consumption theory, we not only find that analysis of the consumption choices by 
individuals in terms of the standard optimizing consumer theory is totally absent from the General Theory, but 
also that Keynes proposes an alternative treatment for the determinants of individuals’ consumption decisions.  
Keynes addresses consumption directly from an aggregate point of view (Keynes 1973a, pp. 61-65; pp. 91 and 
ff.), maintaining that the level of aggregate consumption increases at a decreasing rate as the current income 
increases (Keynes 1973a, p. 96). Notwithstanding this ‘macro’ approach to the question, he also discusses in 
some detail the fundamental determinants of individual consumption but, interestingly enough for a Marshallian 
pupil, he does so without any reference to the maximizing utility apparatus. On the contrary, he provides a list 
of psychological motivations which are behind consumption behavior, emphasizing “subjective factors” which 
lead individuals “to refrain from spending out of their incomes” or, conversely, to consume. According to 
Keynes, the psychological motives behind abstinence are: “Precaution, Foresight, Calculation, Improvement, 
Independence, Enterprise, Pride and Avarice”; whereas the motives behind consumption are: “Enjoyment, 
Shortsighted-ness, Generosity, Miscalculation, Ostentation and Extravagance” (Keynes 1973a, pp. 107-8).  
In the same Chapter of the General Theory devoted to analysis of the propensity to consume (Chap. 9), there is 
also extensive discussion of the fundamental role played by social and institutional factors in determining the 
“strength” of these psychological motives (Keynes 1973a, p. 109). 
Evident here is the distance between Keynes’s approach to consumption and the traditional one. The influence 
attributed to psychological explanations of individuals’ behavior, the consideration given to social and 
institutional aspects, and the mix between ‘rational’ (e.g. Foresight, Calculation) and ‘irrational’ (e.g. Pride, 
Avarice, Ostentation) elements as determinants of the consumption/saving levels open a gap between Keynes 
and neoclassical analysis, on the one hand, while at the same time constituting a bridge with the contemporary 
behavioral approach, which appears, in this light, as a further development of Keynes’s initial intuitions.  
Two other elements characterizing Keynes’s analysis are relevant to our discussion.  
First, there is the idea of a stable consumption profile of individuals, at least in the short period, because 
sociological and institutional factors exercise their influence only smoothly and slowly.
 In this context we should 
also include Keynes’s critique of the negative dependence of expenditure on consumption from the rate of 
interest assumed by the neoclassical school
4 (Keynes 1973a, p. 93). According to Keynes, decisions of 
consumption and saving are not taken simultaneously in function of the rate of interest but, rather, people first 
decide how much to consume, and then how to allocate their savings in different activities.  
Second, there is the adhesion to a sort of status quo bias according to which people, especially in a context of 
‘fundamental’ uncertainty, follow in their actions and decisions (both of consumption and production) some 
conventional rules as for example, “to take the existing situation and to project it into the future, modified only 
to the extent that we have more or less definitive reasons for expecting a change” (Keynes 1973a, p. 148). 
In conclusion, the main elements in Keynes’s analysis which are in sharp contrast with the application, by 
agents, of the standard neoclassical maximizing behavior are: (i) the adoption of the notion of ‘fundamental’ 
uncertainty and related concept of ‘logical’ probability (see, e.g., Carabelli 1988); (ii) the role attributed to the 
social context and the influence of habits and conventions on individuals’ actions; (iii) the employment of a 
notion of rationality which is different from the neoclassical one not only because of the lack of full information 
- as is also admitted in the New Keynesian literature - but because it explicitly considers the complexity of the 
                                                           
4 As far as the long period is concerned the influence of changes in the rate of interest “modify social 
habits considerably […] in which direction it would be hard to say […]”. As far as the short period is concerned 
“fluctuation in the rate of interest is not likely […] to have much direct influence on spending either way” 
(Keynes 1973a, p. 93, emphasis in the text).   
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mental processes and the impact of non-economic factors like psychological, emotional and socially driven 
considerations on individuals’ decisions.   
  
2. Maximizing Foundations for an Aggregate Consumption Function  
2.1 Nobel-prize winning hypotheses  
  The psychological richness of the microeconomic foundations of Keynes’s aggregate consumption 
function had little impact on Post-Keynesian economic thought and was rapidly obscured by the neoclassical 
attempt to base aggregate consumption, too, on the traditional maximizing approach.  
In particular Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957) provided the initial inspiration for models 
within which consumption and saving functions, both for the short and for the long run, were obtained on the 
basis of the life-cycle and permanent-income hypotheses. Their procedure, which provides micro-foundations 
for consumption/saving functions assuming intertemporal utility maximization by rational consumers, soon 
became the standard one, while Keynes’s psychological principles were discarded as useless for the purpose of 
rigorously founding aggregate functions. 
Although the neoclassical attempt to create micro-foundations for consumption and saving functions now seems 
a success story, the consumption function that the neoclassicals succeed in microfounding was very different 
from the Keynesian one. This would have been a minor problem if the neoclassical function were empirically 
more robust than the Keynesian one, but this was not the case. Thus, after a phase of uncritical enthusiasm, it 
became clear that the neoclassical aggregate consumption function, at least in its original version, entailed a 
number of empirical drawbacks. So it was that the neoclassicals were forced to introduce “ad hoc” hypotheses 
within their approach to obtain results compatible with the empirical evidence. Nonetheless, the main drawbacks 
of the approach are still there today.  
2.2 Current consumption as the result of intertemporal utility 
maximization: the life-cycle and  permanent-income hypotheses  
The standard neoclassical approach obtains an aggregate consumption function on the basis of intertemporal 
maximizing behavior of a representative consumer. In this context the consumer will maximize intertemporal 
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γ +  is the discount factor (γ  is the subjective time preference: 











++ ∑∑ t =  is the intertemporal budgeting constraint.  
It is worth noting that in this approach subjects maximize and discount exponentially. 
If we simplify the analysis by assuming that only two times exist,  1 t =  (present) and  2 t =  (future), and that 
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Solving this problem and posing  1 CC =  gives:  














For the general case (T>2 and generic utility functions) the relation is slightly more complex, but its main 
implications remain the same.
 In particular, since in this context wealth, W, can be considered as the current 
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Relation 4 is coherent with the results obtained within the life-cycle approach proposed by Modigliani and 
Brumberg. In their approach current consumption is a function of wealth, and not of current income alone (or 
mainly), as it was in the Keynesian approach. 
We can also refer to relation 4 to derive the consumption function which results on the basis of Friedman’s 
permanent-income hypothesis.
6 Within our context permanent-income can be defined as that constant level of 






















Substituting the right side of relation 5 for W in relation 4, the consumption function can be written as follows: 













  This latter formulation is coherent with Friedman’s approach. 
Neoclassical micro-foundation of the consumption function thus breaks the link between current income and 
current consumption that characterizes Keynes’s original function  ( ) CY χ = and its later IS-LM version 
() d CCc Y =+ : current consumption depends on wealth or, as in relation 6, on permanent-income.  
According to this approach, an unpredictable change in current income (and hence in wealth) generates the so 
called consumption smoothing effect, i.e. a change in both current and (by means of saving) future consumption, 
since “individuals would wish to smooth consumption and not let it fluctuate with short-run fluctuations in 
income” (Meghir 2004, p. 293); whereas a predictable change in current income generates no change in current 
and future consumption, since individuals have already taken that change into account when planning their 
(current and future) utility maximizing flow of consumption. Consumption smoothing has important 
implications for the representative agent’s consumption profile through time. According to Thaler (1990, p. 195) 
“[t]he heart of the life-cycle theory of saving is a hump-shaped age-saving profile. The young, whose incomes 
are below their permanent-income, borrow to finance consumption; the middle-aged save for retirement; the old 
dissave”. 
                                                           
5 In general, wealth is the sum of a number of elements: real capital, financial capital, current labour 
income, future (discounted) labour income, etc. Here we have considered wealth as depending on income alone; 
we could extend the analysis and consider a broader concept of wealth, leaving our conclusions unchanged. 
 
6 In our highly simplified analysis we have deliberately ignored the main difference existing 
between the life-cycle and the permanent-income model, i.e. the circumstance that the time 
horizon is finite for Modigliani and Brumberg, whereas it is infinite for Friedman.  
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2.3 The empirical weaknesses of the life-cycle/permanent-income 
hypothesis  
The consumption theory based on the life-cycle/permanent-income hypothesis comes up against a number of 
problems in coping with many empirical findings, and two major problems in particular: current consumption 
seems more sensitive to current income than is predicted by the theory; and, curiously enough, different forms of 
wealth (and also gains of different amounts) appear to have different effects on consumption, i.e. are not close 
substitutes.  
The first problem follows from the empirical finding that quite often unpredictable changes in aggregate income 
generate variations mainly in current (and not in future) aggregate consumption, whereas predictable changes in 
aggregate income generate variations in aggregate consumption only when they actually occur (and not when 
individuals know that they will occur) – two results which are at odds with the life-cycle/permanent-income 
hypothesis. Current consumption seems therefore to be closely tracking current income and its fluctuations 
(predictable and unpredictable), whereas it does not seem sensitive enough to (expected) future income and asset 
price, i.e. to consumers’ wealth or permanent-income. A number of empirical studies supported these results in 
the 80s (see e.g. Flavin 1981 and 1983, Hall and Mishkin 1982, Wilcox 1989, Zeldes 1989b) and later (see e.g. 
Singleton 1990, Carroll 1994, Shea 1995, Souleles 2002, Stephens 2003). As a result individuals do not seem 
prone to save when the standard theory predicts they should (i.e. when they are middle-aged and should be 
saving for retirement), and also do not seem prone to borrow when they should (i.e. when they are young with 
temporarily low but expected high future income).  
The second problem is particularly intriguing from a theoretical viewpoint. In empirical studies and experiments 
subjects seem to violate the fungibility of money: “The essence of the [traditional] theory is that an individual 
spends the annuity value of his or her wealth in each period, so an extra dollar of housing wealth, pension 
wealth, or current lottery winnings all generate the same increase in consumption. […] this prediction of the 
theory is not consistent with behavior. People behave in ways that suggest that the source or location of wealth 
can influence the marginal propensity to spend it” (Thaler 1994, p. 188). Furthermore, also the dimension of the 
increase in income/wealth can influence the marginal propensity to consume: in particular, people seem to have 
larger marginal propensity to consume out of small rather than out of large extra amount of income/wealth 
(Souleles 2002). Summing up, the propensity to consume out of identical increases in different kinds of 
income/wealth is different, and the propensity to consume out of different increases in the same kind of 
income/wealth is different too (see also Thaler 1990 and Heath and Soll 1996). 
The neoclassical approach has mainly tried to address the first of the above problems. Developments of the 
theory have been based on the hypothesis that subjects have liquidity constraints, i.e. they cannot borrow (see 
e.g. Flavin 1981 and Blinder and Deaton 1985). In this way neoclassicals claim that they can explain the co-
movement of consumption and income. But even this amended version of the theory seems ill-equipped to cope 
with the empirical data, since it can explain why people do not borrow, but cannot explain why they do not save 
enough. And the empirical evidence is robust in showing that in most cases people reduce their consumption 
when they retire since they have not saved enough during their life (see Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg 1997; 
Banks, Blundell and Tanner 1998).
7 Hence, also the consideration of liquidity constraints can explain only half 
of the whole story. 
We believe that behavioral economics might do a better job in providing theoretical explanations of the 
empirical findings which were at the basis of our discussion of the weaknesses of the traditional approach.  
3. Behavioral Foundations for an Aggregate Consumption Function 
3.1 Micro-foundations within a behavioral context 
On the behavioral side, interest in the consumer’s choice was generated with the birth of behavioral economics. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the circumstance that “[a]lmost every where Keynes blamed market failures on 
psychological propensities (as in consumption)” (Akerlof 2002, p. 428), to the best of our knowledge no one has 
till now explicitly made the attempt to link the “new” psychological principles referred to by (contemporary) 
behavioral economists when studying consumption behavior, with the “old” psychological principles referred to 
by Keynes when building his aggregate consumption function. Our argument is that, since the two sets of 
principles are actually quite similar, the enormous number of empirically based theoretical studies proposed by 
behavioral economics can contribute to provide sound and up-to-date micro-foundations for both the original 
                                                           
7 The standard approach faces other problems in deriving the explicit solution for consumption when 
uncertainty about future income exists. Solutions to these problems were provided (see e.g. Carroll 1992 and 
Zeldes 1989a) within models with impatient consumers and precautionary saving. 
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and later IS-LM version of Keynesian consumption function, reconciling the Keynesian approach with micro-
foundations, and consumers’ theoretically predicted behavior with the empirical evidence. 
Unlike neoclassical theory, behavioral economics does not possess one single, simple principle (maximizing 
subjects) and one simple procedure (maximization under constraint) on the basis of which to ground, from a 
theoretical viewpoint, subjects’ behavior. Behavioral economics is, rather, made of a variety of models and 
based on a multiplicity of determinants for subjects’ behavior. Therefore, the problem of microfounding 
aggregate functions changes abruptly. Within the neoclassical approach, once given some more or less ‘ad hoc’ 
assumptions on the characteristics of the utility function, the maximizing procedure determines the form and the 
values of the parameters for the resulting aggregate function. Within a behavioral context, the lack of a single 
principle and a single procedure able to dominate the others implies that we can only speculate on the links 
between a great number of often vague principles and some general property of the aggregate function. It is 
hence not legitimate to derive aggregate functions on the basis of any simple mathematical procedure.  
On these aspects behavioral economics and Keynes’s method are identical. Keynes did not build his aggregate 
functions on a single principle and a single procedure. Rather, he indicated a plurality of psychological 
principles and discussed the connections among them and the properties of the aggregate functions (although his 
study of the psychological principles was not as deep as that made by the many models of behavioral 
economics). This procedure came in for criticism, with the argument that Keynes did not microfound his 
aggregate functions. But the opposite is true. In the presence of a multiplicity of possible determinants for 
subjects’ behavior the correct microfounding method seems more a listing than a derivative procedure, as for the 
aggregate functions in behavioral economics. 
The same arguments apply when we try to propose behavioral micro-foundations for the consumption function. 
In this case, a great number of psychological principles are in general able to explain, at least partially, some 
specific characteristics of the actual behavior of aggregate consumption. These psychological principles will 
enter our “list” of micro-determinants for the building of an aggregate behaviorally and empirically based 
consumption function. In the following pages we have tried to limit our list to the smallest possible number of 
principles compatible with the necessity to take account of empirical findings. The main among these principles 
are preference for procrastination, shortsightedness (or myopia) and miscalculation, mental budgeting and debt 
aversion. Many of these principles are quite similar to those used by Keynes in the construction of his 
consumption function, i.e. “Enjoyment, Shortsighted-ness, Generosity, Miscalculation, Ostentation and 
Extravagance” (Keynes 1973a, p. 108). And, moreover, all of them have been explained applying different 
theoretical approaches of behavioral economics. 
It is important here to stress that it is far from our intentions to suggest that subjects never maximize 
intertemporally, never smooth consumption, and never consider wealth and future income in their consumption 
choices. Simply, we suggest that maximizing behavior (foresight and calculation, in Keynes’s words) is neither 
the only nor the principal among the determinants of consumption choices (i.e. among the many items of our list 
of principles). It can contribute to the building of an empirically based consumption function on a level of equal 
importance with other behavioral principles (and their explicative models).  
3.2 Preference for procrastination  
The first principle, preference for procrastination, has recently been thoroughly studied within the hyperbolic 
discounting approach. This approach accepts maximizing behavior but criticizes the traditional procedure for 
obtaining an aggregate consumption function, which is based on exponential discount and implies time 
consistency (consumers make choices at time t for t+n that they will confirm when t+n arrives), since “[c]asual 
observation, introspection, and psychological research all suggest that the assumption of time consistency is 
importantly wrong. Our short term tendency to pursue immediate gratification is inconsistent with our long term 
preferences” (Rabin 1998, p. 38). If time consistency is not satisfied, agents make choices at time t for t+n that 
they won’t confirm when t+n arrives. Another empirical finding that the exponential discounting procedure 
cannot grasp is that real “agents are relatively farsighted when making tradeoffs between rewards at different 
times in the future, but pursue immediate gratification when it is available” (Ho, Lim and Camerer 2006, p. 21). 
The implications of all these empirical findings are self-control problems or preference for procrastination 
(people decide to do tomorrow the unpleasant task they were supposed to do today, e.g. begin a diet or save, but 
when tomorrow arrives they decide to procrastinate to the day after tomorrow, and so on) and declining instead 
of constant discounting rates. Hyperbolic discounting models can cope with all these empirical findings without 
going too far from the neoclassical realm.  
The first contribution on the theme of hyperbolic discounting was by Strotz (1956). He criticized the realism of 
the exponential discounting procedure and suggested that better specifications for the discounting function 
should imply declining discounting rates. However, he did not propose any specific alternative functional form. 
A number of specific functional forms have since been proposed (for a list see Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, 
Tobacman and Weinberg 2001, p. 50, fn. 13; and Frederick, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue 2002, p. 360). In 
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general, “[h]yperbolic discount functions are characterized by a relatively high discount rate over shorts 
horizons and a relatively low discount rate over long horizons. This discount structure sets up a conflict between 
today’s preferences, and the preferences that will be held in the future” (Laibson 1997, p. 445).  
The easiest way to model hyperbolic discounting is to write down the intertemporal utility function as 






















=+⋅ ∑ . However, often enough 
theoretical analysis refers to quasi-hyperbolic or present-biased models, within which the intertemporal utility 
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+ ∑ , where  1 β < (see e.g. Phelps and Pollak 1968 and 
Laibson 1997).  
The existence of different possible hyperbolically discounted functions, coupled with different possible 
assumptions on the ‘smartness’ of subjects, have generated a number of different models. Some among these 
models are built on the hypothesis that consumers are “sophisticated”, i.e. that they have rational expectations 
(Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 1998) and realize that tomorrow they will be unwilling to do what they are 
procrastinating today. Other models are built on the hypothesis that subjects are naïf (Strotz 1956, O’ Donoghue 
and Rabin 1999 and 2001) and do not realize that tomorrow they will be unwilling to do what they are 
procrastinating today.  
All these approaches bear implications different from those of the standard framework but allow economists to 
treat hyperbolic discounting using otherwise traditional tools (see on this point Rabin 1998, p. 40). In particular, 
nothing changes in the idea that subjects maximize their utility function. The only difference is in the 
discounting method they apply. But the hyperbolic discounting approach models subjects that, albeit following a 
maximizing procedure, make time inconsistent choices (see e.g. Strotz 1956; Angeletos et al. 2001, pp. 51-52). 
This explains why hyperbolic discounting also represents a departure from the traditional concept of rationality 
(contra see Browning and Crossley 2001). 
The hyperbolic discounting models hold two major implications for our analysis. First, due to problems of self-
control that prevent people from saving, effective saving will always be less (and consumption more) than 
predicted with the traditional approach.
8 Second, subjects make time inconsistent choices, so that the excess of 
consumption will spread through time. Hence hyperbolic discounting can theoretically account for the 
preference for procrastination and, at least partially, myopia. By accounting for the preference for 
procrastination hyperbolic discounting can explain why saving proves less than predicted by the traditional 
theory, but can alone explain neither insufficient borrowing, and hence the co-movement of income and 
consumption, nor the non-fungibility of money.
9  
From what precedes follows that the co-movement of income and consumption can only be the result of 
introducing ad hoc hypotheses. So that the role of hyperbolic discounting approach in the building of a 
behaviorally based aggregate consumption function is not essentially different from that played by liquidity 
constraints in the exponential discounting approach: one can explain insufficient saving, the other insufficient 
borrowing, both can be used as one among many theoretical building blocks for an empirically based 
consumption function, but neither of them can alone justify consumption tracking income. Moreover, neither 
hyperbolic discounting nor exponential discounting can address the other problems that we discussed in section 
2.4 above. To deal with these problems and study models able to fully explain the co-movement of consumption 
and income without introducing special cases and “ad hoc” hypotheses we have to search for something else, 
and, to do so, we have to refer to psychological principles which are totally at odds with the intertemporal 
maximizing approach.  
3.3 Myopia and miscalculation  
Myopia and miscalculation are two among these principles, and they are at least partially explained by 
hyperbolic discounting (as we saw in section 3.2) and mental accounting (as we will see in section 3.4). Myopia 
implies that individuals fail to behave as the traditional life-cycle/permanent-income approach predicts because 
their capacity to correctly predict future events diminishes as these events go away in time. Miscalculation, 
                                                           
8 With reference to the analysis in section 2.3, the assumption that subjects discount hyperbolically covers the 
circumstance that saving for retirement is often less than what predicted by the traditional theory (and less than 
what subjects need for maintaining their level of consumption when retired). 
9 Laibson’s model (1997), combining hyperbolic discounting with strong assumptions on the constraints 
that  t selves are able to impose on the consumption behavior of t+n selves, depicts subjects who cannot 
adequately smooth consumption, so that consumption tracks current income. 
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whether induced by myopia or not, implies that individuals fail to behave as the traditional life-cycle/permanent-
income approach predicts because they are not able to solve the complex intertemporal maximization problems 
involved in consumption/saving choices (see e.g. Thaler 1994, p. 187). As a result, these approaches generate 
non-maximizing behavior. 
It is certainly true that the mere recognition that people do not intertemporally maximize can suffice to criticize 
the validity of the standard approach, but it cannot suffice to build an aggregate consumption function on 
alternative theoretical bases. However if people do not intertemporally maximize, their current consumption will 
track current income and consumption smoothing disappears. Ultimately, therefore, rejection of intertemporal 
maximization is not only an element for criticism of the traditional approach, but also holds constructive 
implications.  
3.4 Mental budgeting and debt aversion  
The other non-maximizing principles that can be used in order to microfound an aggregate consumption 
function are mental budgeting and debt aversion. Mental Accounting seems the best theoretical scheme 
equipped to deal with both these principles.  
Mental budgets are self-control devices: “consumers budget portions of their total resources to separate mental 
accounts (e.g. entertainment or household expenses) and then track expenses against the budgets. As expenses 
are incurred, they deplete the funds available in their account, which makes future purchases less likely” (Heat 
and Soll 1996, p. 40). In other words, certain amounts of money are ex-ante (before occasions of consumption 
arise) earmarked for specific types of consumption, and there is considerable reluctance to transfer money from 
one account (i.e. from one type of planned consumption) to another (i.e. to another type of planned 
consumption). It is worth noting that building inflexible budgets implies the impossibility of re-allocating money 
among different accounts, so that utility cannot be maximized.
10 The behavioral economics theoretical schemes 
devoted to the study of mental budgeting is mental accounting, even if the concepts of mental budgeting and 
mental accounting are often used as synonymous. Mental accounting offers further fuel to critiques of 
consumers’ intertemporal maximizing behavior, and hence could also account for the Keynesian concepts of 
shortsightedness (or myopia) and miscalculation. But fundamentally mental accounting can explain the two 
crucial problems of non-fungibility of money (due to mental budgeting) and insufficient borrowing (due to debt 
aversion). Insufficient borrowing, coupled with insufficient saving, can explain the circumstance that 
consumption tracks income.  
The violation of the fungibility of money follows from the circumstance that “people distinguish between wealth 
in categories like ‘current spendable income’ and ‘current assets’, and are more willing to consume an increase 
in current income […] than an increase in current assets” (Heat and Soll 1996, p. 41). Mental accounting helps 
explain why the propensity to consume out of the same increases in different types of wealth/income (or out of 
different increases in the same type of wealth/income) is different (see e.g. Heath and Soll 1996 and Thaler 
1990): different types/amounts of wealth/income go to different mental accounts and each mental account is 
linked with a different propensity to consume. Mental accounting can therefore explain what the life-cycle, the 
permanent-income and also the hyperbolic discounting approach cannot: why people consume different 
fractions out of different types/amounts of income.  
The insufficient level of borrowing due to debt aversion follows from Prelec and Loewenstein’s “Double Entry 
Mental Accounting Theory” (see Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). According to them, subjects “establish mental 
accounts that create symbolic linkages between specific acts of consumption and specific payments. Acts of 
consumption and financial transactions call mental accounts to mind, which generates pleasure or pain 
depending on whether the accounts are in the red or in the black” (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998, p. 5). In 
particular, when acts of payment are delayed with respect to the consumption experience (as in credit purchased 
goods) “thoughts of payment can undermine the pleasures of consumption” (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998, p. 8), 
i.e. the utility deriving from actual consumption is reduced by the disutility deriving from expected payment so 
that subjects suffer utility losses. As a consequence, mental accounting can generate strong debt aversion (and 
even preference for pre-payment).
11  
                                                           
10 “[w]hen people budget too little money, they may underconsume goods that they desire. When they 
budget too much, they may overconsume goods that they desire less. These predictions clearly differ from those 
of economic consumer theory, which assumes that people always consume an optimal quantity of each good” 
(Heat and Soll 1996, p. 40). 
 
11 “Contrary to the standard prediction that people will finance purchase to minimize the present value of 
payments, our model predicts strong debt aversion – that they should prefer to prepay for consumption or to get 
paid for work after it is performed. Such pay-before sequences confer hedonic benefits because consumption can 
be enjoyed without thinking about the need to pay for it in the future” (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998, p. 4).  
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Debt aversion deriving from mental accounting can explain the paradoxical circumstance, for the standard life-
cycle theory, that young people with temporarily low income but high future expected income “fail to borrow 
sufficiently against future earnings” (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998, p. 15). People are not unable to borrow: 
rather, they are unwilling to borrow due to debt aversion.  
3.5 The microeconomic foundations for an aggregate consumption 
function 
We have seen that a number of principles can be used as microeconomic determinants for a behaviourally based 
aggregate consumption function. Each of these principles is responsible for an empirical result and can be 
explained theoretically by referring to a behavioural model: preference for procrastination generates insufficient 
saving and can be accounted for with the hyperbolic discounting approach; myopia and miscalculation generate 
involuntary non-maximizing behaviour and can be accounted for with hyperbolic discounting and mental 
accounting; mental budgeting generates non-fungibility of money and can also be accounted for with mental 
accounting; debt aversion generates insufficient borrowing and can, again, be accounted for with mental 
accounting; preference for procrastination and debt aversion together make consumption track income and can 
be accounted for with hyperbolic discounting and mental accounting together (or by Laibson 1997 model alone); 
finally, maximizing behaviour (i.e. foresight and calculation) generates consumption smoothing and can be 
accounted for with the traditional maximization under constraint approach. Other psychological principles and 
explicatory models could be added. However, the short list we propose suffices to obtain a simple but sound, 
empirically-based aggregate consumption function. 
The function described above increases the heuristic power of both the traditional neoclassical and the 
Keynesian approach, getting closer to the empirical evidence and taking account of the circumstance that, in the 
real world, decisions are taken responding to more than one (simple) principle. What this function cannot 
furnish is an a-priori evaluation of the weight of each principle in determining consumption behaviour when 
actual cases have to be studied. This shortcoming is an inevitable consequence of the circumstance that reality 
responds to a multiplicity of different rules whose actual relevance changes from case to case. 
What remains to discuss is the method to be used to build construct this aggregate consumption function. 
If a multiplicity of behavioral principles exists, and maximizing behavior is only one principle among many 
others, then not only do we have to consider all of them when micro-founding the aggregate consumption 
function, but we must necessarily also change the micro-founding method. In other words, if the only behavioral 
principle of individuals were maximization under constraint, we could obtain the aggregate function as the result 
of a maximizing procedure alone. On the other hand, if maximizing behavior is no more than one single 
principle among many others, we cannot obtain the aggregate function on the basis of a maximizing procedure 
alone and must consider together all the different principles and all the different possible procedures which 
matter when building the consumption function. Hence, not only do we have to change the microeconomic 
behavioral principles (from always maximizing to often non-maximizing behaviors) and the number of them 
(from one single principle to many), but we must also change the method for building the aggregate 
consumption function (from maximizing procedures to other procedures). 
The same problem had also been faced by Keynes, since his principles were more than one, and maximizing 
behavior was (at least) one among others. In an initial phase of his analysis he dealt with this problem by listing 
and discussing the microeconomic characteristics of the psychological principles affecting consumption. But, 
since his analysis was exploitable for the purpose of obtaining a fairly stable propensity to consume, he had no 
need to (and actually did not) go deeper into the macroeconomic implications of his list of principles, precisely 
formalizing the impact of these psychological principles on the consumption function. Incidentally, theoretical 
analysis capable of dealing with many of these principles simply did not exist at the time. Hence, he assumed as 
given these “subjective factors” and truncated his analysis by writing his very simple  () CY χ =  consumption 
function. All the post-General Theory (neoclassical and behavioral) theoretical developments discussed in this 
paper have shown that such a strategy is no longer sufficient, the very existence and relevance of a relation 
between consumption and income being questionable. Since theoretical models capable of dealing with these 
principles now exist, discussion of the impact of all the relevant psychological principles on aggregate 
consumption must and can be fully carried out, including explicitly all these principles (and all the models that 
explain these principles) in formal specification of the consumption function.       
We believe that the first phase of Keynes’s method can be used in this case too: not a maximizing procedure, but 
listing of psychological principles with discussion of their relevance and their impact on the aggregate 
consumption function. Simply, Keynes's procedure has to be fully implemented and driven to its natural 
conclusions. 
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3.6 Construction of the aggregate consumption function 
Having discussed the microeconomic principles and the method to be used to build an aggregate consumption 
function, let us now go on to propose a possible formalization of it. However, some preliminary assumptions 
have to be made. 
In the present paper we have shown that, in general, each type of income/wealth has an impact on consumption 
which depends on its characteristics and dimension, i.e. each type of income/wealth possesses its own propensity 
to consume. And nothing could in principle prevent the value of each of these propensities to consume from 
being the result of interaction among different principles. However, in our formalization we rule out this 
possibility by assuming that the propensity to consume out of a certain kind of income/wealth cannot depend on 
more than one single theoretical principle. With this assumption we can encompass all the different principles 
within the analysis without having to weight them. For the sake of simplicity we will also disregard the 
dependence of each propensity to consume on the size of income/wealth.  
If preference for procrastination, myopia or shortsightedness, miscalculation, mental budgeting, debt aversion 
and maximizing behavior are the psychological principles, and hyperbolic discounting, mental accounting and 
maximization under constraint are the possible theoretical foundations for the consumption function, within a 
two-period time span (t and t+1) i consumer's consumption function could be written as follows: 
7) 
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In this functional relationship the propensity to consume varies across different kinds of income/wealth for the 
same consumer and varies across consumers for the same type of income/wealth. And, consistently with the 
overall philosophy of our approach, there is no single-principle rule, chosen a-priori – not even for the 
discounting procedure. Different principles and different procedures have the same legitimacy and each of them 
will be more or less suited for the treatment of the different real cases. As a result, future incomes can be either 




represents the measure of our ignorance regarding other determinants of the consumption function, i.e. the 
exogenously given quantity of consumption that is explained by causes other than those included in our list. It is 
worth noting that 
, it
C  is not a stochastic error term: it is not our intention, at least in this phase of study, to 
present a non-deterministic function.  
  We understand that our consumption function and the procedure for building it is less elegant, less 
formally sophisticated, much more complex and also much more difficult to apply for forecasting purposes than 
the traditional neoclassical and Keynesian ones. This may explain why economists prefer to use simple, elegant 
one-principle procedures. But nowadays, now that empirical analysis has shown that a multiplicity of principles 
influence consumption and theoretical analysis has developed models to formalize these influences, using single 
principle procedures almost exclusively is no longer justified. We therefore suggest that economists stop 
developing single-principle procedures devoted to the study of single special cases, often of little empirical 
relevance, and take full account of the complexity of the real world by studying the way in which a number of 
different principles (and of different theoretical approaches) combine to influence consumption behavior on a 
basis of a-priori theoretical equal importance.   
As a result of the above considerations our function, although quite different from the Keynesian one, is 
however Keynesian in its inspiration: it is obtained on the basis of many of the Keynesian psychological 
principles and of a Keynesian method, and is built by driving the Keynesian approach to full implementation.   
                                                           
12 These different discounting procedures have no impact on the formal specification of relation 8 due to 
the circumstance that our consumption function considers only time t and t+1. 
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4. Conclusions and possible developments 
The main goal of our paper was to discuss the possibility of cross-fertilization between the Keynesian approach 
and contemporary behavioral economics, with particular reference to the consumption theory. We believe that 
this possibility exists, since behavioral economics and the Keynesian approach have a number of relevant 
theoretical foundations in common. In particular, our analysis has shown that: 
(i)  the maximizing procedure is not at the heart of Keynes’s consumption theory; 
(ii)  a number of behavioral principles can be detected in Keynes’s discussion of individual choices 
relating to consumption and many of these principles are quite similar to those used by 
behavioral economists; 
(iii)  the traditional analysis of aggregate consumption based on maximizing agents shows serious 
empirical drawbacks and is not consistent with Keynes’s consumption theory;  
(iv)  analysis of aggregate consumption grounded on behavioral principles is possible, allows for 
better representation of reality itself, and is more consistent with Keynes’s consumption 
theory; 
(v)  such an approach has the great advantage of taking full theoretical account of the circumstance 
that actual consumption behaviors are the result of the contemporary operate of a plurality of 
behavioral principles. 
Our paper simply indicates a direction for future research. Further studies are necessary in order to develop the 
consumption function here proposed and its formal properties better; more behavioral principles need to be 
scrutinized and possibly added to our list; the empirical robustness of our aggregate function needs to be fully 
tested. But we believe that one-principle theoretical approaches must be abandoned and that Keynes’s work can 
be extremely useful in bringing contemporary behavioral economics into macroeconomics. 
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